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BROKEN PROMISES: IMPLEMENTATION
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

BOARD RULE 106, ERISA, AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO MODIFICATION AND
TERMINATION OF POSTRETIREMENT

HEALTH CARE BENEFIT PLANS
MARmYN J. WARD FoRD*
From the standpoint of the whole system of social economy, no
employer has a right to engage men in any occupation that exhausts the individual's industrial life in ten, twenty, or forty
years, and then leave the remnant floating on society at large as
a derelict at sea.1
Although spiraling health care costs have been prompting companies to scale back the amount of retiree health benefits for over
a decade, the new accounting rule under FAS 106 ["Financial Accounting Standards Board Rule 106"] has made the problem
more severe ....
The companies' decisions are imposing financial hardship on many retired workers, who believed their health
benefits were covered for life.2
INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency, retirees are losing company
health benefits. Exemplifying this disturbing trend4 is Societe
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. The author acknowledges
the valuable assistance of her research assistants, Francis Caruso and Edward
O'Garro, in the preparation of this article.
1 DAN M. MCGILL, FuNDAwmeNTALs OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 17 (1979) (quoting LEE
WELLING SQUIER, OLD AGE DEPENDENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 272 (1912)).

2 Chairman William J. Hughes made the above comments before Congress at the
House Select Committee on Aging Hearings. At the hearings, retirees from several
corporations, including McDonnell Douglas Corporation and Unisys Corporation, testified to illicit congressional action that would prevent employers from breaking
promises to provide retiree health benefits. FAS 106 Is PromptingMany Companies
to Reduce Benefits, House Panel Hears, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (Mar. 5, 1993)
[hereinafter FAS 106 is Prompting].
3 A survey conducted by Greenwich associates revealed that 6% of corporate pensions discontinued health coverage for retirees, while another 21% reduced benefits.
More Funds Drop Retiree Medical Care, Reduce Coverage, Manager Survey Finds,
Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (Apr. 26, 1993). Before the id-1980s, more than 60% of
firms having 500-990 employees provided retiree health benefits. According to a
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Nationale Elf Aquitaine, Inc.'s ("Elf Aquitaine") recent treatment
of retired Texasgulf, Inc. ("Texasgulf") executives. On July 6,
1981, Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine Inc., a $25 billion French
corporation, and Texasgulf, with its corporate offices located in
Stamford, Connecticut, agreed to an amended tender offer made
pursuant to section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
Under the terms of this agreement, EA Development, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Elf Aquitaine, offered to purchase Texasgulf.6 Among other provisions, the amended tender offer contained express promises to "maintain all employee benefit plans
with levels of benefits payable at least equal to the levels then in
effect."7 Texasgulf was acquired in accordance with the amended
tender offer on September 25, 1981.
study by KPMG Peat Marwick, that number dropped to 37% in 1992. Dawn Gunsch,
How Companies Fund Retiree Medical Benefits, 72 PERSONNEL J., Nov. 1993, at 78.
4 UNISYS will phase out retiree health benefit contributions by the end of 1995.
McDonnell Douglas implemented the same policy effective at the end of 1992. See
FAS 106 Is Prompting,supra note 2.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988 & Supp. 1993).
6 Pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78kk
(1988 & Supp. 1993), E.A. Development filed and published its offer to purchase all
the outstanding shares of Texasgulf.
7 Section 12 of the amended tender offer provides as follows:
PURPOSES OF OFFER AND PLANS FOR CONTROL OF THE COMPANY
In all events, the Purchaser (EA Development) and SNEA (Societe National Elf Aquitaine) expect to continue whatever pension and other
employee benefit plans the Company now has or to offer comparable
benefits under new plans.
On July 6, 1981, in response to the amended tender offer, Texasgulf filed and
mailed to all shareholders its Schedule 14D-9, "Solicitation/Recommendation Statement Pursuant to Section 14(d)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Item 3 of
that Schedule 14D-9 refers to the July 6, 1981 amended offer as Exhibit 2, attached
and incorporated by reference. Item 9 of the same schedule lists as "Exhibit 2-Agreement between Texasgulf, Inc. and Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine, dated July 6,
1981."
Texasgulf filed an Amended Schedule 14D-9 on July 10, 1981. The July 10 document emphasized the importance of paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement of July 6, 1981
with respect to benefits by including the following language in item 3:
Upon obtaining the agreement of Elf to amend the Elf offer.., the Board of
Directors determined that it would be in the best interests of the Company
to take steps to provide for management stability in view of the uncertainty
created by the Elf offer. In that connection the Company and Elf entered into
an agreement dated July 6, 1981 (the "Agreement"). The Agreement provided for. .. (viii) continuation of other existing employee benefit plans or,
where appropriate, the institution of substantially similar plans with comparable levels of benefits. A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and is incorporated herein by reference.
The July 6, 1981 agreement was signed by plaintiff Mollison in his capacities as
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of Texasgulf. Mollison
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On April 17, 1990, the president and chief executive officer of
Elf Aquitaine sent a letter to former senior officers of Texasgulf
notifying them of the Texasgulf Senior Officers Medical Plan's termination. The letter stated as follows:
April 17, 1990
Re: Termination of Senior Officers Medical Plan
Gentlemen:
You will undoubtedly be aware of the rapid escalation in
medical costs occurring throughout the nation.
Our Company is not immune from this trend, and in the
years since 1987 our medical costs have doubled.
We are forced by the lack of a national health cost containment plan to increase our employee's share of medical costs and
to tighten up on benefits utilization ....

In this setting it is in-

creasingly difficult to justify the existence of a separate 100% reimbursement plan for senior officers. The continuation of this
plan will create morale problems with our workforce and for this
reason is being terminated effective May 31, 1990 ....
I regret that this benefit must be terminated and expect that
you will agree that it is necessary to do so in the best interests of
the company as a whole.
Upon receiving the letter, Richard D. Mollison, a seventy-four
year old retiree of Texasgulf, former chairman of its board of directors, and chief executive officer until June 1982, commenced an
action for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut.'
later asserted that the agreement induced him as a shareholder to accept the tender
offer, and as a Director and Chairman of the Board to send his letter of July 7, 1981 to
all shareholders of Texasgulf. The letter, in relevant part provides as follows: "Your
Board of Directors has carefully considered the increased offer. We have decided to
facilitate our shareholders making their investment decisions with respect to acceptance of this Elf Aquitaine offer and we will not oppose the offer."
a Mollison v. Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine, Civ. Action No. B90-247, was filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. A temporary restraining order was issued against Elf Aquitaine on May 29, 1990, and a temporary
injunction was granted by the Honorable T.F. Daly on August 17, 1990. The action
was settled and the complaint was withdrawn in December 1990. See Retiree Benefit
Terminationis Halted by CourtRestrainingOrder, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1990, at Bli
(ordering injunction); Retiree's Health Benefits Can't be Cut For Now, Judge Rules,
22, 1990, at B5; CourtDelays Retiree Benefit Cut, Bus. INs., Aug. 27,
1990, at 38 [hereinafter Court Delays]; see also Court: Company Can't Cut Off Health
Benefits, GREENWICH TimE, May 31, 1990, at A15; Bruce Shutan, Altering Retiree
Health Plans:Prudence or Broken Promises?,EMPLOYEE BENErr NEws, Aug. 1990, at
3; Court: Firm Can't Halt Ex-Officer's Health Plan,STAMFORD ADvoc., Aug. 22, 1990,
at A17.
WALL ST. J., Aug.
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The complaint alleged that Texasgulf had (1) provided liberal
health and welfare benefits for all employees and their dependents, at its own expense, prior to and during the plaintiff's employment which began in 1947 and (2) provided basic health insurance, including eighty percent reimbursement for all medical
and dental expenses at no cost to the recipients.
The complaint further alleged that in 1974 Texasgulf implemented another plan in consideration for plaintiff's and other senior officers' continued employment with Texasgulf and their contribution and loyalty to the company. This plan provided for and
established, at Texasgulf's complete expense, a medical and
health care insurance plan to supplement the basic health and
welfare plan for all employees. The supplemental plan (1) was
designated as the Senior Officers Medical Plan, (2) provided 100%
lifetime reimbursement for all medical and health care costs incurred by Texasgulf senior officers at and above the level of corporate secretary and their surviving spouses, (3) was established in
consideration and exchange for employment and services provided, (4) was part of the compensation for Texasgulf senior officers, (5) expressly provided that upon retirement, retired covered
senior officers would continue to be entitled to receive 100% lifetime medical reimbursement for all medical and health care costs
that Texasgulf had undertaken to provide them and their spouses,
at no cost to the recipients, (6) was in existence on July 6, 1981,
when the amended tender offer agreement with Elf Aquitaine was
signed, and (7) was approved, assumed, continued, and administered by Elf Aquitaine after the merger and through the date of
plaintiff's action seeking an injunction against Elf Aquitaine. Finally, the complaint alleged that Texasgulf failed to reserve the
right to terminate the supplemental plan, modify it to reduce the
level of benefits received, or impose contributions by covered
participants. 9
Retirees of Texasgulf, Elf Aquitaine, and other corporations
throughout the United States have asked why their employers
9 The plaintiff alleged that both the basic health care insurance benefits plan for
all employees and the supplemental plan, which provided 100% lifetime reimbursement for all senior officers' medical and health care expenses, were "employee welfare
benefit plans" as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 833 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993)) [hereinafter ERISA] and that the defendants were fiduciaries with respect to the plans and
programs within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). The complaint alleged violations of ERISA, breach of contract, estoppel, and other claims.
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have broken promises to provide postretirement health care benefits. The answer is that the absence of a national health care plan,
escalating health care costs, and the then "proposed" new accounting rule regarding reporting of retiree health benefits liabilities
have all contributed to broken promises to provide retiree medical
benefits.

I. FNANciAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD RuLE 106
FAS 106 has become a kind of scourge of financial termites undermining the foundation of what retirees thought was a solid
component of security.'
A

The Scourge of FinancialTermites

The current national liability for retiree medical benefits is
estimated at a staggering $400 billion to $2 trillion." According
to William J. Hughes, Chairman of the House Select Committee
on Aging, the number of companies joining Elf Aquitaine and cutting promised retiree health benefits has increased since the Financial Accounting Standards Board began requiring employers
to report retirees' health benefit liabilities. 12 Mr. Hughes characterized the situation as both a "personal and national tragedy
when corporations renege on their longstanding obligation
to pro13
retirees.
to
benefits
insurance"
health
vital
vide
Many of the corporations that have "broken promises" to provide postretirement health benefits blame their action on a new
accounting rule.' 4 They assert that to comply with the new rule
they were forced to modify or terminate their plans and incur sig10 Comments of Daniel J. Schulder, Director of the National Council of Senior
Citizen's Dept. of Legislation. FAS 106 is Prompting,supra note 2.
11 Comments of Stephen Metz, Senior Consultant, Coopers & Lybrand in Tampa,
Florida at the 1993 Risk & Insurance Management Society Inc. Conference. Michael
Schachner, Small Firms CanLearn Lessons From Others' FAS 106 Encounters,Bus.
INs., May 3, 1993, at 7.
12 FAS 106 is Prompting,supra note 2.
13 FAS 106 is Prompting, supra note 2; see AIDS Bill Would Ban Retroactive
Changein Terms of Group Health Care Coverage,Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (Mar. 17,
1993). Rep. Bill Hughes introduced a bill to prohibit employers from retroactively
amending the terms of their group health plans. Id.
14 But see FAS 106 is Prompting,supra note 2. Michael Cotter, Senior Vice President of the Haygroup, believes FAS 106 is a catalyst for the implementation of new
policies regarding reduction of retiree health benefits, but not the underlying cause.

Id.
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nificant after-tax charges. 15 Unisys Corp., Primerica Holdings,
Inc., General Motors Corp., and Ford Motor Co. are among those
who have implemented retiree health benefit changes. 16 According to media accounts of information contained in Securities Exchange Commission filing documents, General Motors sustained
the largest after-tax charge ever, an enormous $20.8 billion in
1992 to account for its retiree health care obligations.' 7 Similarly,
Ford Motor Co. reported a $7.5 billion after-tax charge incurred to
18
comply with the rule.
This new accrual accounting standard, controversial Rule
106: "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other
Than Pensions," ("SFAS 106, Rule 106, or the Rule"),' 9 was issued
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")20 in De15 Musa A1-Darayseh, The $1,000,000,000,000 Dilemma; Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Under FASB Statement 106: FinancialAccounting Board, 37 NAT'L
PuB. ACcT. 22 (Nov. 1992).
16 FAS 106 is Prompting,supra note 2.
17 Doron P. Levin, G.M. Lost $23.5 Billion Last Year, N.Y. TmRs, Feb. 12, 1993,
at D1.
18 Court Delays, supra note 8; see Doron P. Levin, Ford Lost $7.4 Billion Last
Year, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 11, 1993, at C3, D5. Other major companies have reported
equally significant losses: Upjohn Co.-$237 million, Chrysler Corp.-$3-4 billion,
and Kellogg Co.-$269.7 million. James V. Higgins, Rule Change Brings Big
Losses-On Paper,DET. NEWS, Dec. 30, 1992, at C7. Ameican Telephone & Telegraph
Co. ("AT&T") likewise reported a loss of $7 million. Gunsch, supra note 3. Losses to
the electric utility industry as a whole are estimated to be $12 billion. Electrics'
'Transition Obligation' under FASB-106 at Least $12 Billion, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK.,
May 25, 1992, at 15 [hereinafter Electrics' Transition].
19 EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 106 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.

1990) [hereinafter FAS 1061. Standards and regulations promulgated by FASB must
be adhered to by private companies, foundations, and not-for-profit corporations.
PAUL B.W. MILLER & RODNEY REDDING, THE FASB: THE PEOPLE, THE PROCESS & THE
POLITICS 21 n.14 (1986).

20 The FASB is a private organization located in Norwalk, Connecticut. It sets
standards for use in general purpose financial reporting, a function previously performed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA7). The
FASB defines its mission as one to establish and improve standards of financial ac-

counting and reporting for the guidance and education of the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of financial information. MILLER & REDDING, supra note 19,
at 18-22.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") authority over financial accounting and reporting standards for publicly held
companies. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993). The SEC relies on the FASB and
the private sector for this function to the extent that the private sector demonstrates
an ability to fulfill the responsibility in the public interest. Id.
Since 1973, the SEC and the AICPA have recognized the FASB's pronouncements
as authoritative accounting guidelines. The SEC and Committees of Congress oversee
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cember 1990, and became effective for fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 1992, for publicly held corporations and private employers with more than 500 plan participants as defined by the
rule.21 Its effective date is delayed to fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 1994, for plans outside the United States, nonpublic
employers, and certain small employers with 500 or fewer participants as defined by the rule.
B. Accrual Accounting And Disclosure Under Rule 106
Pursuant to rule 106, the anticipated cost of postretirement
medical expenses and benefits other than pensions must be accrued. The rule also requires that the obligation to pay these benefits be recognized-on the employer's financial statements-during the employee's active service in the same manner in which
pension benefits are accounted for.2 2 Rule 106 has been characterized as a disclosure regulation, similar to rules arising from the
federal securities acts. 23 However, because rule 106 also requires
the employer to accrue and account for the postretirement liabilities, it extends beyond the securities laws.2 4
the FASB to ensure that it serves the public interest when it adopts rules and carries
out its functions. Id.
21 FAS 106, supra note 19. Paragraph entitled "Effective Dates," SFAS No. 106
provides as follows: 'This Statement generally is effective for fiscal years beginning
after December 15, 1992, except that the application of this Statement to plans
outside the United States and certain small, nonpublic employers is delayed to fiscal
years beginning after December 1994." Id.
22 FAS 106, supra note 19. See "Summary" paragraph entitled "Effective Date"
which provides:
This Statement establishes accounting standards for employers' accounting for postretirement benefits other than pensions (hereinafter referred to as postretirement benefits). Although it applies to all forms of postretirement benefits, this Statement focuses principally on postretirement
health care benefits. It will significantly change the prevalent current practice of accounting for postretirement benefits on a pay-as-you-go (cash) basis
by requiring accrual, during the years that the employee renders the necessary service, of the expected cost of providing those benefits to an employee
and the employee's beneficiaries and covered dependents.
Id.
23 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1988 & Supp. 1993); The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
24 It can be argued that one of Rule 106's results, if not objectives, is to force
employers to accrue and account for postretirement benefits liabilities, thereby guarding against "gross underfunding" of postretirement benefit plans and preventing a
situation as occurred with the savings and loan industry which bankrupted the
F.S.L.I.C. Both the Labor Department's and the Assistant Treasury Secretary Leslie
Samuels expressed concerns of this nature. A draft of the Labor Departments September 30, 1993 proposal to prohibit employers from establishing "age-weighted
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Congress adopted the federal securities acts following the
stock market crash of 1929, the Depression, and hearings which
established that lack of disclosure by issuers and underwriters of
securities had caused shareholders to make imprudent investment decisions. Witnesses testified that the failure to disclose relevant information about the issuer and the securities being offered and sold permitted the fraud, manipulation, and deception
of shareholders who invested in risky companies and lost fortunes 2 5 in the securities market. They gave deplorable accounts of
how investors had been manipulated into investing in "shares of
blue sky" by purchasing the stock of companies that had concealed
their lack of assets.
Both Congress and President Roosevelt 26 rejected appeals for
federal legislation designed to provide merit review of securities
and guarantee the value of new public offerings which would prevent investors from making imprudent investment decisions and
buying risky securities. Instead, Congress enacted legislation
that requires adequate and meaningful disclosure of material2 7 inprofit-sharing plans" contains several reforms "aimed at shoring up the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's ("PBGC") financial position." The proposal's primary objective is strengthening underfunding rules for defined benefit pension plans; however, it
also prohibits age-weighted profit sharing plans which "allow substantial tax shelter
for high-paid employees while providing little benefit for rank-and-file workers and
none of the protections provided under defined benefit plans." PBGC Reform Proposal
Would Eliminate Use Of Age-Weighted Profit SharingPlans,Pens. & Ben. Daily at 26
(Oct. 1, 1993).
25 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 875 (1993) (stating that "losses of investors have been appalling. Statistics indicate that such losses have amounted to
the colossal sum of $25,000,000,000 during the past 10 years.").
26 In his message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce. In spite of many State
statutes the public in the past has sustained severe losses through practices
neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling securities. Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not
take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit. There is,
however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to
be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue
shall be concealed from the buying public.
Id.
27 A misstatement or omission of information is material if it is "ofsuch a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who
was in the process of deciding how to vote." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lito Co., 396 U.S.
375, 384 (1970); see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964) (stating remedial
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formation by companies that utilize interstate commerce, the
mails, or any national securities exchange facility to sell their securities to the public. 28 The philosophy behind the federal securities acts is that adequate disclosure of financial and other relevant
information about the issuer and the securities permits shareholders to make intelligent investment decisions.
The FASB adopted the accrual accounting standard of rule
106 because it believes that failure to disclose and accrue postretirement benefit costs implies that "no obligation exists prior to
the payment" of the benefits, and that "failure to recognize an obligation prior to its payment impairs the usefulness and integrity of
the employer's financial statements."2 9 The accounting method
required by the rule ensures that the present value of employees'
postretirement benefits will be accrued as of the date they become
fully eligible to receive them under the postretirement benefits
plan. The philosophy of the FASB, reflected in rule 106, is that
requiring accrual and disclosure of relevant information about
postretirement benefits obligations in employers' financial staterelief is available for stockholder damaged by proxy statement containing false and
misleading statements).
28 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1993), requiring
the issuer, underwriter, and dealers participating in securities distribution to register
with the Securities Exchange Commission and provide a prospectus to offerees, unless
the securities are exempt or the transaction in which they are issued is exempt under
provisions of sections 3 or 4 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988 & Supp. 1993).
29 FAS 106, supra note 19. See "Summary" which provides:
The ability to measure the obligation for postretirement health care
benefits and the recognition of that obligation have been the subject of controversy. The Board believes that measurement of the obligation and accrual
of the cost based on best estimates are superior to implying, by a failure to
accrue, that no obligation exists prior to the payment of benefits. The Board
believes that failure to recognize an obligation prior to its payment impairs
the usefulness and integrity of the employer's financial statements.
The Board's objectives in issuing this Statement are to improve employers' financial reporting for postretirement benefits ....
Id.
Several major corporations, including AT&T, General Motors Corp., Chrysler
Corp., and Ford Motor Co., "moved swiftly" in 1992 not to adopt Rule 106 and take a
write-off, but to comply with SEC Accounting Bulletin No. 74, or make the required
disclosure, get the "bad financial news behind them," and then take the tax write-off.
Accounting Bulletin No. 74, Disclosure of the Impact that Recently Issued Accounting
Standards Will Have on the Financial Statements of the Registrant When Adopted in
a Future Period requires publicly held companies to disclose the "potential impacts of
FASB pronouncements not yet in effect and to report them in SEC filings." Stanley
Zarowin, How Business is Dealing With FASB 106; Accounting For Postretirement
Benefits, 73 J. OF AcCT. 7 (Mar. 1992).
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ments will provide adequate information to employees and others
who rely on the integrity of those statements.3 0
C. ContractualObligations and Deferred Compensation
Rule 106 permits employers to prefund or allocate funds necessary to cover employees' postretirement expenses as they are
earned, or alternatively, to account for the expenses as a liability
on their balance sheets.3 ' Prefunding postretirement benefits will
require employers to relinquish control of assets and set them
aside in a segregated account restrictedand used only for payment
32
of the benefits.
Unlike pension benefits, health care benefits are generally
unfunded.3 3 Prior to the adoption of rule 106, most employers accounted for retiree health care benefits and other postretirement
nonpension benefits on a "pay-as-you-go" (cash) basis. Claims
were made and then paid out on behalf of retirees and their covered dependents and beneficiaries. 4 The rule explicily sets forth
the FASB's concern about this practice. It states that as "the
prevalence and magnitude of employers' promises to provide those
benefits have increased, there has been increased concern about
the failure of financial reporting to identify the financial effects of
those promises." 5
30 Deborah Harrington, FASB Manager of public relations, expressed the aim of
FASB 106 as putting all investors on equal footing so as to facilitate comparison of
companies. Higgins, supra note 18.
31 The present value of postretirement benefits must be fully accrued by the time
an employee is eligible to receive benefits. James R. Wilbert & Kenneth E. Dakdduk,
The New FASB 106: How to Account for PostretirementBenefits, 72 J. OF AccT. 36
(Aug. 1991). The transition is instituted at the beginning of the year in which the
plan is adopted. Al-Darayseh, supra note 15. There is an obligation under FASB to
account for any existing benefits that arose prior to adoption of the plan. This transitional obligation may be spread over the average expected future service of participants or realized in its entirety in the first year. David Langer, Planners Cope with
SFAS 106; Statement of FinancialAccounting Standard; PersonalFinancialPlanning, 62 C.P.A. J. 75 (1992). It is realization of this liability in the first year that has
led to the large paper losses reported by some corporations. Higgins, supra note 18.
32 Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31; see Electrics' Transition, supra note 18.
Transition obligation may be funded by setting aside additional assets. Id. These
assets must be placed in a segregated trust account. Higgins, supra note 18.
33 Sharon Kahn, Save Now, Pay Later; CorporationsPreparefor the Cost of Retirement Benefits, 81 MGMT. REV. 28 (Apr. 1992). William M. Mercer, a New York
consulting firm, estimates that only seven percent of companies currently prefund to
any degree. Id.
34 Id. Accrual at retirement, another method utilized by employees to account for
benefits, is also unacceptable under FASB 106. Id.
35 FAS 106, supra note 19.
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Rule 106 requires employers to accrue the expected cost of
these nonpension postretirement benefits and to recognize the obligation to pay them as employees earn them-accrual accounting.
The rule thus acknowledges that an employer's promise of health
care and other postretirement benefits constitutes a contractual
obligationrather than a gratuity. According to the FASB, an employer's promise of postretirement benefits reflects "an exchange
between the employer and the employee." The employee gives
consideration in the form of "current services" for the employer's
promise of future benefits. 6
In "exchange for the current services provided by the employee, the employer promises to provide, in addition to wages and
other benefits, health and other welfare benefits after the employee retires."3 7 Rather than characterizing postretirement benefits as gratuities, the FASB views them as part of an employee's
compensation for services rendered during active employment.
Since payment is deferred, the benefits are a type of deferred
compensation. 38
The employer incurs the obligation for postretirement health
benefits as employees render the services necessary to earn those
benefits.3 In sum, the accrual accounting requirement that Rule
106 imposes on employers reflects the FASB philosophy that postretirement benefits are forms of deferred compensation similar to
pension benefits, and that this characterization requires that they
be obligations reflected in financial statements and recognized as
employees earn the right to receive the benefits - during their
active working careers.
D. Application of Rule 106
Rule 106 applies to all postretirementbenefits "expected to be
provided by an employer to current and former employees, including retirees,"4 0 regardless of whether the benefits are provided
under a written or unwritten plan.4 ' It applies to such things as
cost-sharing where the employer has paid a certain percent of the
FAS 106, supra note 19.
FAS 106, supra note 19.
Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31.
39 FAS 106, supra note 19; see Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31. The present
value of postretirement benefits must be fully accrued by the time of employee eligibility. Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31.
40 FAS 106, supra note 19,
106.6.
41 FAS 106, supra note 19, T 106.8 which provides:
36
37
38
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benefit costs and the employee has paid the balance. This situation may evidence a mutual understandingbetween the employer
and employee.
Rule 106 requires employers to consider the terms of their
written plans and the mutual understandings even if they are not
contained in a writing. The FASB believes that mutual understandings represent substantiveplans under rule 106. It also believes that substantive plans may differ from the written plan and
create liability for which the employer must account. The rule focuses on the mutual understanding or the substantive plan, and
the accrual accounting should reflect the exchange transaction of
the substantive plan as understood by the employer and the employee. Rule 106 applies to accounting for life insurance, tuition
assistance, health care, day care, disability benefits paid to permanently disabled employees who are deemed retired,42 legal
services, and all postretirement benefits, excluding pensions,43
which employers reasonably anticipate providing to current and
future retirees and their covered dependents and beneficiaries.
This Article is limited to rule 106's application to health care because it is the most significant benefit covered. The cost incurred
An employer's practice of providing postretirement benefits may take a
variety of forms and the obligation may or may not be funded. This Statement applies to any arrangement that is in substance a postretirement benefit plan, regardless of its form or the means or timing of its funding. This
Statement applies both to written plans and to unwritten plans whose existence is discernible either from a practice of paying postretirement benefits or
from oral representations made to current or former employees. Absent evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that an employer that has provided postretirement benefits in the past or is currently promising those
benefits to employees will continue to provide those future benefits.
Id.
The above FASB statement demonstrates that accrual accounting and liability
recognition requirements focus on the "substantive plan," which reflects the mutual
understanding between the employer and the employee, and which may differ from
the "written plan." This FASB position-substantive plan versus written plan-has
the potential for even more litigation to determine whether or not a plan exists and
what was promised. See generally Langer, supra note 31, at 75 (explaining that "[i]f
an unwritten or incomplete plan is in existence, a 'substantive' plan may still be in
effect . . . if employees can expect to receive benefits based on prior company
practices").
42 Severance pay and wage contribution to disabled or terminated employees are
not within the ambit of FASB 106. Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31.
43 FAS 106, supra note 19, $ 106.11 provides that "[t]his Statement does not apply to pension or life insurance benefits provided through a pension plan." It is being
noted that Rules 87 and 88 adopted by the FASB in 1987 apply to postretirement
pension benefits.
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by employers in connection with the other benefits, although accounted for in substantially the same manner, will be relatively
insignificant when compared with health care expenses. 44
E. Implementation of Rule 106
Employers that provide postretirement health care benefits
and are subject to rule 106 may not "opt out" of compliance. To
implement rule 106, employers are examining the rule and its accrual accounting requirements and options, performing actuarial
valuations to assess the magnitude of their obligation to provide
postretirement benefits 4 5 under currently existing plans, 4 6 and

44 FASB "focuses on retiree health benefits more than any other benefits because
they are the most costly and the most difficult to [quantify]." A1-Darayseh, supra note
15. As an example, General Motors estimates its current obligation as $21 million,
the bulk of which pertains to medical coverage. Gunsch, supra note 3.
45 FAS 106, supra note 19, T 106.20. "Basic Elements of Accounting for Postretirement Benefits" defines an employer's postretirement benefit obligations as the Expected Postretirement Benefit Obligation ("EPBO") and the Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation ("APBO"). The EPBO is the actuarial present value of all
benefits expected to be paid to covered plan participants and their dependents-after
the retirement date-as of the measurement date. The APBO is the actuarial present
value of future benefits to be paid to employees and their covered dependents based
on the service rendered, as of the measurement date. The APBO includes the EPBO
for retirees, the EPBO for past service rendered by active employees who have not
satisfied eligibility requirements under the plan and the EPBO for active employees
who have satisfied eligibility requirements. Pursuant to FAS 106, the EPBO is not
required to be disclosed in the institution's financial statements; however, the APBO
must be disclosed. A1-Darayseh, supra note 15.
The FASB recommends that employers do the following to ascertain liability for
postretirement health benefits and to implement Rule 106:
a. Review their postretirement benefit plans and make sure they thoroughly understand the promises contained in the plans; study their promises and what benefits
they are required to provide.
b. Gather information on plan participants-the individuals who will receive
benefits (i.e. for both active and retired participants), gather information on their age,
sex, and number of dependents.
c. Gather information on the current cost of providing benefits offered by the
plan; that provides a base for a projection of the future cost of benefits.
d. Work with an actuary and auditor to develop assumptions about how future
experience is likely to develop under the plan.
According to the FASB, these four steps provide the basis for an informed estimate of the cost of postretirement benefits and the necessary starting point for the
accrual accounting required under Rule 106.
46 Postretirement benefit plans vary in eligibility (age and years of service) requirements and cost sharing (premiums, annual deductibles, and co-payments) arrangements. Some provide benefits through self-insurance, whereby the employer assumes the risk for health care claims by its active and retired employees and their
covered dependents and beneficiaries. Other plans provide benefits through insurance
companies or third party administrators.
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considering new plan designs and funding options to temper the
new standard's impact on their financial statements.
Implementation of rule 106 will necessitate collaboration
among many corporate departments. Human resources and benefits personnel will be needed to provide data on covered participants, the number and nature of claims filed, specific terms of retiree benefit plans, and plan modification models. Financial
personnel must measure the employer's obligations under the new
accrual accounting requirement, select accounting options and actuarial assumptions to be utilized, and evaluate funding options
and decisions. Actuaries must perform calculations and advise
management on the measuring process, and auditors must evaluate compliance.
Employers must select a "transition"4" method to adopt. Rule
106 allows employers either to (1) immediately recognize the accumulated obligation for postretirement benefits that have already
been earned, which may create a deficit, or (2) "recognize the transition obligation in the statement of financial position and statement of income on a delayed basis over the plan participants' future service periods,"4 9 i.e., prospective amortization of the
obligation, which may also result in a deficit.
47 Rule 106 requires employers to accrue and report the anticipated cost ofpostretirement medical benefits. See FAS 106, supra note 19. The cost may be recorded on
the balance sheet as an existing liability as well as an increasing annual expense. Id.
48 FAS 106, supra note 19, I9 106.247-.267. Also, a section entitled 'Transition"
in the official summary to F.A.S. 106 provides: "Unlike the effects of most other accounting changes, a transition obligation for postretirement benefits generally reflects, to some extent, the failure to accrue the obligation in the earlier periods in
which it arose rather than the effects of a change from one accrual method of accounting to another." Id. 91106.247. The official summary further provides: "The Board [believes] that transition is . . . a practical matter. [In addition] a major objective of
transition is to minimize implementation costs and mitigate the disruption to the extent possible without unduly compromising the ability of financial statements to provide useful information." Id. %106.250.
49 FAS 106, 991 106.250-160.253 further provide:
Two options [are provided] for recognizing that transitionobligation. An
employer can choose to immediately recognize the transition obligation as
the effect of an accounting change, subject to certain limitations. Alternatively, an employer can choose to recognize the transition obligation in the
statement of financial position and statement of income on a delayed basis
over the plan participant's future service periods, with disclosure of the unrecognized amount.
However, that delayed recognition cannot result in less rapid recognition than accounting for the transition obligation on a pay-as-you-go basis.
FAS 106, supra note 19, 91106.250-160.253.
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Employers that select the immediate transition method-and
record an increased expense and resulting financial deficit- must
realize the potential negative effect on bond ratings in addition to
the potential for triggering "events of default" under loan agreements. They should review loan documents and obtain waivers or
modifications from lenders of any provisions under which compliance with rule 106 would hinder the employer's ability to maintain designated levels of fund balances or liquid assets.
Implementation of Rule 106 will cause expensive and major
changes in practices regarding balance sheets. Whether an employer opts to sustain the entire unfunded liability immediately or
to amortize it on the balance sheet for a period not to exceed
twenty years, 50 the impact of change in accounting standards
could have a tremendous budgetary impact. In fact, implementation of the rule has already resulted in a reduction of approximately "$1.5 trillion to set up reserves for retiree medical
benefits." 5
F.

Effects of Compliance with Rule 106: "EconomicDownturn,"
After-tax Charges, Reduction in Shareholder'sEquity,
and Broken Promises to Provide Postretirement
Health Benefits

Since its adoption, publicly held corporations have grappled
52
with rule 106 and its effect on net worth and stockholder equity.
Many are attempting to balance compliance and the astronomical
growth in liability for health care benefits to active and retired
employees. Some corporations are opting to spread their accumulated retiree health care liability over the twenty year 53allowed period, while others are opting to take a "one time hit."
50 FAS 106, supra note 19, at T 106.254.

51 Lee Berton, Clinton Plan to Pay Much of Premiums ForEarly Retirees Could
Boost Profits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24 1993, at A2, C2. The article reports that several
companies took "big hits" to their reported 1992 profits because of the accounting rule.
See Roslyn Retkwa, TreasuriesAdd the Icing: Building Optimal Capital Structures
That Can Support a Tasty Future, CORP.CASHFLOW, Dec. 1993, at 15; Kathleen Day
& John Mintz, Health Care'sPainful Changes:More Retirees are Left in the Lurch as
Firms Slash Health Coverage, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H1; Marcus Gleisser,
New Accounting Rule Takes Effect, PLAIN DRATER,Dec. 18, 1993, at IF; Levin, supra
note 18, at D5; Eric D. Randall, New Rule is a Reality Check for Companies, USA
TODAY, Feb. 3, 1993, at 4B; Jube Shiver, Jr., The Group that ForcedBig Accounting
Change: FASB Tells Firms How to Keep the Books, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1993, at C6.
52 See Wilbert & Dakdduk, supra note 31.
53 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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On February 11, 1993, General Motors Corp. ("General Motors") reported the largest loss ever by an American corporation. 4
According to The New York Times,5 5 the loss was $23.5 billion for
1992.56 Most of the "red ink" was sustained because of accounting
changes required by rule 106.57 General Motors charged $20.8 billion against earnings to account for future retiree health benefits.5 8 Without the $20.8 billion charge, General Motors would
have reported significant earnings for 1992. 59
The February 10, 1993, The New York Times reported that
Ford Motor Co. ("Ford") "posted an $840.3 million fourth-quarter
loss today and a $7.4 billion loss for the year."60 As with General
Motors, the loss was primarily due to a one-time $7.5 billion
charge against 1992 earnings reflecting an accounting change for
retiree health benefits in compliance with rule 106.61
The management of Unisys Corp. ("Unisys") determined that

compliance with rule 106 would result in an after-tax charge of
$170 million in 1993.62 As a result, Unisys announced on November 3, 1992, that it would modify its benefits plans by phasing out
the company's contributions to retiree health insurance costs and,
as of 1996, by requiring its 25,000 retirees to pay all of their
health care expenses.6 3 Unisys projected that these changes
54 Levin, supra note 17; see G.M. Takes Largest FAS 106 Hit, Bus. INs., Feb. 8,
1993, at 2.
55 Levin, supra note 17.
56 Levin, supra note 17.
57 Levin, supra note 17.
58 Levin, supra note 17.
59 Most of that aftertax charge ($20.8 billion) was taken to account for GM's accumulated retiree health care obligations in compliance with Rule 106. Id. GM also expected to report a Rule 106 "transitional" obligation of $16 to 24 billion. See supra
notes 48-50. Approximately 365,000 retirees and spouses are covered under GM's
postretirement health benefits plan. GM has Approximately 362,000 active employees
in the United States. See G.M. Takes Largest FAS 106 Hit, supra note 54.
60 Levin, supra note 18.
61 Levin, supra note 18.
62 Anthony Gnoffo Jr., Unisys Retirees To Pay For Insurance, PILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 4, 1992, at C1, D7.
63 Id.; In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits ERISA Litig., 837 F. Supp. 670
(E.D. Pa. 1993), mot. granted, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1344 (E.D. Pa. Jan 5, 1994). The
court explained:
In September of 1986, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs Corporation
merged to form Unisys Corporation. After the merger, Unisys maintained
the pre-existing medical benefit plans ("the predecessor plans") for Sperry
and Burroughs retirees. In 1989, Unisys created the Post-Retirement and
Extended Disability Medical Plan ("the old plan") to cover all employees who
retired after April 1, 1989, most of whom were former Sperry and Burroughs
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would dramatically reduce its retiree benefits liability, estimated
at $100 million per year and rising.6 4

Within days of the announcement, a class action was commenced challenging Unisys' decision. 65 As with the action against
66
Elf Aquitaine, retirees of Unisys, Primerica Holdings, Inc., and

other corporations acted against their employers for breach of
promises to provide postretirement health care benefits.
While discussions regarding national health care reform and
the nation's $400 billion to $2 trillion "health care tab" continue, 7
employees. At that time, Unisys left the predecessor plans intact. On January 1, 1993, Unisys terminated the predecessor plans and the old plan and
replaced these plans with the new Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended
Disability Medical Plan ("the new plan"). Under the new plan, the retirees
no longer receive free medical insurance. Instead, they must pay a portion of
the monthly premiums. After January 1, 1995, the retirees will have to pay
the full cost of premiums.
Id. at 672.
64 Gnoffo, supra note 62.
65 In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. at 672. Eight separate lawsuits were filed by former
employees of Unisys and its predecessors, Sperry Corp. and Burroughs Corp., as a
result of this decision. Id. The cases were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for disposition as a class action by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id.
66 See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1296 (D.N.J.), mot.
denied, 822 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J.), mandamus granted, 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
The plaintiffs asserted that American Can Co. (Primerica's predecessor) and Primerica maintained a retirement plan which provided lifetime pension and medical benefits for qualified retired employees. Id. at 1299. On or about January 9, 1989, Primerica notified the plan beneficiaries of a tenfold increase in their monthly mandatory
contributions to the group medical insurance plan, id. at 1300-01, despite alleged
promises that the contribution amounts were fixed. Id. at 1299.
On October 26, 1992, almost three years after the retirees filed suit, Primerica
announced additional modifications to the plan. Id. at 1303. The letter to the beneficiaries stated:
With this letter, we are notifying you of an additional change in your rates;
but, we are offering you some additional coverage choices as well.
In 1993, Primerica will offer the following choice of coverage: 1) a newly
designed program (the "New Plan") only for retirees and/or spouses over age
65 that has been designed to cost the same $50 per month as you are currently paying; 2) the programs currently offered to Primerica Corporate...
retirees, both over and under age 65 (called CCC/SB below); and 3) your current medical programs (the "Current Medical Plan"), both over and under
age 65 ....
Effective January 1, 1993, retirees in the Primerica Group Insurance Plan
for Retired Salaried Employees will begin paying premiums to cover 100% of
the cost of continuing medical coverage. This decision is in line with Primerica's policy on medical coverage for retirees in those of its subsidiaries that
offer continuing coverage.
Id. at 1303-04.
67 See Comments of Stephen Metz, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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employers must find ways to control skyrocketing costs, comply

with Rule 106, and fulfill benefits promises to present and future
retirees.
II.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO BROKEN PROMISES

Many employers are responding to rule 106 and the recent

geometric increases in retiree benefits liability by restricting plan
eligibility, cutting spousal and dependent coverage, imposing retiree payment of deductibles and co-insurance, and placing caps
on lifetime or annual
health benefits. Others are simply terminat68
ing their plans.
In order to support these unilateral modifications, employers
are asserting that benefit plans did not exist,69 that termination
or modification is their "right or prerogative," and that the Em68 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

69 There is no clear definition of the word "plan" in ERISA. "Employee welfare
benefit plan" is defined, somewhat circularly, as "any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). Cf Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1357, 1362 (D.N.J. 1982) ("Neither Congress nor the Department of Labor has been
very specific about what constitutes a 'plan, fund or program' for purposes of § 1002").
Nevertheless, entitlement to receive postretirement health care benefits under
ERISA may be established by an oral agreement, memoranda, affidavits, or by a practice of providing benefits, and the same is enforceable in federal court. See id.;Alexander, 819 F. Supp. at 1302-03. In fact, a written health care benefits plan is not a
prerequisite to ERISA coverage or to the establishment of the right to receive postretirement benefits. Donovan v. Dillinqham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en
banc). There, the court set forth the following test:
To be an employee welfare benefit plan, the intended benefits must be
health, accident, death, disability, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds,
prepaid legal services or severance benefits; the intended beneficiaries must
include union members, employees, former employees or their beneficiaries;
and an employer or employee organization, or both, and not individual employees or entrepreneurial businesses, must establish or maintain the plan,
fund, or program.
Id. at 1373. In Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
stated that "the existence of a written instrument is not a prerequisite to ERISA coverage." And, in Alexander, 819 F. Supp. at 1302-03, the court held that:
Because a Plan document does not exist and because the [summary plan
descriptions] are ambiguous, the district court, as the trier of fact, must determine whether the Plan provided lifetime benefits upon retirement .... In
interpreting an ambiguous ERISA plan, a court may consider the intent of
the plan's sponsor, the reasonable understanding of the beneficiaries, and
past practice, among other things. In this regard, we note that the retirees'
affidavits and documents, if believed by the district court, are sufficient to
show that the Plan promised lifetime irreducible benefits.
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ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA) 70 does
not apply to postretirement benefits plans other than pensions. 1
Affected beneficiaries are continuously seeking relief for violations
of ERISA, breach of collective bargaining agreements or other express or implied contracts,7 2 and promissory estoppel.7 3 Employers are responding with arguments that postretirement health
care plans are not covered under ERISA, that there is no federal
Id. Thus, although ERISA requires plans to be in writing, this is not part of the definition of the word "plan." The requirements are for administrative and reporting purposes only; failure to comply does not exempt a plan from ERISA's coverage. Any
other result would be inconsistent with Congress' express intent to protect an employee's interest in employee benefit plans, whether or not his employer satisfied the
administrative or reporting requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
70 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
71 These assertions are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), where an employer's termination
pay and stock purchase plans were deemed to be "employee welfare benefit plans" or
"employee pension benefit plans" covered by ERISA. Also, Congress' express intent in
adopting the statute, see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988), and other federal court cases
support the application of ERISA to postretirement health care benefit plans. See,
e.g., Petrella,529 F. Supp. at 1361.
72 Postretirement benefit plans are usually established under a union-negotiated
collective bargaining agreement with employers, or unilaterally by an employer for
the benefit of nonunion employees. In the absence of a written plan or an explicit
contractual obligation to provide such benefits, a history of benefits payments to employees or retirees may nevertheless bind employers as implied agreements. See
supra note 69. The test for an implied agreement is simply "whether the conduct and
acts of the parties show an agreement." Brighenti v. New Britain Shirt Corp., 356
A.2d 181, 183 (Conn. 1974).
73 Employers may be estopped, by principles of equitable or promissory estoppel,
from denying their obligations under existing benefits plans, or from denying that
certain employees are covered by these plans, once the employees have relied to their
detriment on assurances of coverage by employers. See Amato v. Western Union Intl,
Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1419-20 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986); Vogel v.
Independence Fed. Sav. Bank, 692 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D. Md. 1988), modified, 728 F.
Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
In these cases, employees and retirees have successfully argued that equity prevented their employers from revoking promises of benefits, after receiving the consideration of continued employment, services and loyalty, by withdrawing, reducing, or
terminating the promised benefits after employees had retired in reliance on them.
Both courts held that a breach of contract action could be brought for violation of an
ERISA plan, and that the principle of estoppel applies. See Whitworth Bros. Storage
Co. v. Cent. States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986) (applying federal common law under
ERISA to "actions premised on contractual obligations created by ERISA plans"). Employees and retirees argue that revocation of promised postretirement health benefits
is unconscionable because senior citizens are in the greatest need of such benefits,
they are often unable to acquire them from any other sources, and employers have
already received consideration for these benefits in the form of services and loyalty
during employment.
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common law of employee benefits under ERISA, that no contract
or basis for promissory estoppel exist, and that postretirement
benefit plans can be modified for both active employees and retirees since there is no vesting of welfare benefits.
A. ERISA's Application to PostretirementHealth Care

Plans

In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to "promote the interest of
employees [and retirees] and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans and to protect contractually defined benefits. '74 Senator
Jacob Javits elaborated on the intent of Congress:
In view of Federal preemption, state laws compelling disclosure
from private welfare or pension plans [and] imposing fiduciary
requirements on such plans . . .will be superseded. It is also

intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the Courts to deal with issues involving rights
and obli75
gations under private welfare and pension plans.
Prior to adopting ERISA, Congress conducted an investigation which revealed that employees looked to pension income as a
means of financial security for their old age, and that employer
abuses and mismanagement of pension plan assets had deprived
millions of retirees of their pensions and economic security.76 Following the investigation, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA), 77 essentially a fed74 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 113.
120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
76 See Marilyn J. Ford, The Aftermath of Daniel:Private Pension Plans, ERISA,
and the FederalAntifraud Provisions, 46 Mo. L. REv. 51 (1981), stating that:
In 1958 Congress concluded an investigation which revealed that millions of dollars in pension plan assets had been stolen or embezzled by officers of some unions. It was also discovered that many employee pension
plan assets were wasted due to payment of unjustifiably large salaries to
plan administrators and union officials, kickbacks, self-dealing by administrators, and failure of administrators to exercise reasonable care and prudence in investing pension funds.
Id. at 53 n.9 (emphasis added) (citing S. REP No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, 11
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4137-40, 4147).
77 Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 2, 72 Stat. 997 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970))
(repealed 1975).
In 1958, the Senate Committee on Improper Activities in Labor Management Relations ("the Committee") concluded an extensive investigation which uncovered
widespread embezzlement, payment of exorbitant salaries, self-dealing, waste, and
general mismanagement of some private pension plan assets by their administrators.
The Committee concluded that the abuses resulted from the absence of a comprehensive federal statute which would provide uniform and effective regulation of private
pension plans, and which would remedy the almost complete absence of any financial
75
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eral disclosure statute that provided pension plan participants
with information about their plans. ERISA, a comprehensive statute specifically adopted to protect pension plan assets from abuse
and mismanagement and to protect employees' interests in those
assets, replaced and repealed the WPPDA. Although ERISA does
7
not require employers to provide any employee benefits plans, it
does regulate the establishment and operation of employer pension plans, which provide retirement income and welfare plans,
which in turn provide all other employee benefits. 79 When Conaccounting or reporting regarding pension plan assets to participants, beneficiaries,
or governmental authorities. See Ford, supra note 76.
After concluding its investigation, the Committee prepared a report which recommended the adoption of a federal disclosure act mandating publicly available information concerning the operation and administration of private pension plans. The report articulated the Committee's belief that public disclosure of pertinent information
about private pension plans and their assets would protect the assets and millions of
people relying on those assets for future economic security. Id.
Congress adhered to the Committee's recommendation by adopting the WPPDA,
which was essentially a federal disclosure statute designed to protect pension plan
assets from abuse by plan administrators. The Act was also designed to provide private pension plan participants and their beneficiaries with sufficient information
about their pension plans so that they could discover any mismanagement, and if necessary, seek relief under applicable federal and state laws. Id.
78 See Allied Chem. and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157 (1971) (holding that postretirement benefits are permissive rather than mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
When postretirement benefit plans are established on behalf of union employees
under collective bargaining agreements, actions to challenge modification and to enforce rights to receive promised benefits may be brought under § 502 of ERISA. The
plaintiffs may sue in federal district court and allege breach of the plan document
under ERISA. Union members and their beneficiaries may also allege breach of the
collective bargaining agreement terms and bring their action under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Section 301"). Similarly, they may seek to
enforce rights to receive promised benefits under promissory estoppel, alleging either
Section 301 promissory estoppel or ERISA promissory estoppel in some jurisdictions.
When postretirement benefits plans are provided unilaterally to nonunion salaried
employees, actions challenging plan modification or seeking to enforce rights to receive payment of benefits may also be brought under Section 502 of ERISA, promissory estoppel, and other contract claims. Id.
79 See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(setting forth four-prong test to determine meaning of "plan, fund or program" under
ERISA).
To be an employee welfare benefit plan, the intended benefits must be
health, accident, death, disability, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds,
prepaid legal services or severance benefits; the intended beneficiaries must
include union members, employees, former employees or their beneficiaries;
and an employer or employee organization, or both, and not individual employees or entrepreneurial businesses, must establish or maintain the plan,
fund, or program.
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gress adopted the statute, the primary concern was to protect
promised retiree pension benefits. The enactment of ERISA responded to recurring financial instability in private pension plans
and to employer abuses and mismanagement of plan assets.
These problems resulted in the loss of promised postretirement
pension benefits to retired employees.
ERISA was enacted at a time when most employees retired at
age sixty-five and obtained postretirement medical coverage
through Medicare. Welfare plans were not prefunded, employee
contributions were not required, and costs were low. Employers
were not as concerned about costs because they operated welfare
plans on a pay-as-you-go basis. Expenses were met out of current
revenue, costs were spread over twenty or more years, and active
employees provided the revenue needed for retiree welfare
benefits.8 0
Welfare benefits, especially postretirement health care, have
become increasingly important to active employees, retirees, and
employers in the years since ERISA's adoption. Medical care costs
have been escalating at an uncontrollable rate. Employees have
been working for several employers during their active careers
and have been retiring at younger ages from their last place of
employment with less than twenty years of service. For various
reasons, many employees have taken "early retirement" between
fifty-five and sixty years of age. They rely exclusively on their
health care plans for medical benefits until they reach age sixtyfive, whereupon they qualify for Medicare.
Today, when employees take early retirement, their last employer usually pays the entire cost of postretirement health care
benefits received until they reach age sixty-five. Employers are
incurring astronomical expenses in maintaining postretirement
health care plans, especially plans that provide lifetime benefits
for retirees and their dependents. The extraordinary expenses reId.
80 In the past, most corporations had several active employees for every one retiree receiving benefits. Today, many corporations have one working employee for
every retiree and are enduring an almost impossible financial burden in maintaining
escalating medical benefits payments. See Ruling In Favor of GM's Early Retirees
Contains ImportantLessons For Employers, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), at 4 (Aug. 5,
1991). According to Gregory McDonald of the General Accounting Office, there are
approximately nine million private sector retired workers who are currently covered
by private company health care plans and 32 million active employees who anticipate
coverage under these plans when they retire. Id. at 5.
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sult from increases in the number of retirees, longer lifespans,
higher health care costs, and rising costs of health insurance.
Pursuant to ERISA, Congress imposed reporting requirements,8 disclosure provisions,

2 funding

safeguards,8 3 plan termi-

4

nation insurance requirements, participation and minimum
vesting requirements, 5 and fiduciary standards.8 6 The requirements with respect to the funding, participation, and vesting of
benefits were designed to prevent further abuse by employers in
the establishment and operation of pension plans. ERISA's requirement that employers provide detailed material information
regarding their plans is designed not only to ensure proper pension management, but also to ensure that adequate funds are set
aside to provide retirees with promised pension benefits.
Although ERISA regulates both pension plans and welfare
plans, it does not contain similar requirements with respect to the
participation, funding, and vesting of benefits.8 7 Thus, courts
have held that there is no automatic statutory health care benefits
vesting right. 8 Congress did not provide strict requirements for
81 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). Pension plan administrators are required to
prepare and file a description and summary of the pension plan and its annual report
with the Secretary of Labor. Id. §§ 1021(b), 1023(a), 1024(a).
82 Plan administrators are required to provide each participant with a summary
and detailed description of the plan within 120 days of establishment of the plan or
within 90 days after one becomes a participant, whichever occurs later. ERISA also
requires the plan administrator, upon request, to provide each participant with a record of his accumulated and vested benefits and other documents relevant to the plan.
Id. 99 1021(a), 1023(a), 1024(b), 1025(a).
83 Id. §§ 1081-1082.
84 Id. §§ 1301-1368 (1988).
85 Id. 99 1052-1053 (1988).
86 Id. §§ 1101-1114.
87 In the absence of automatic statutory vesting rights for welfare benefits under
ERISA, retirees' claims of vested lifetime health care benefits must be based on the
plan's terms expressed in the summary plan descriptions, other documents, or other
"persuasive evidence." Courts have generally held that unlike pension benefits, postretirement health care benefits do not automatically vest when the employee retires.
See Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
Although ERISA does not contain requirements for participation, funding, or
vesting of welfare plans, Congress expressly stated its intent that a federal common
law of ERISA be developed by federal courts to regulate welfare plans. See H.R. REP.
No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 5038, 5107
[hereinafter REPORT]; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
88 See Moore, 856 F.2d at 488 (holding that welfare benefits do not automatically
vest under ERISA). The court stated that "to require the vesting of these ancillary
benefits (those that fall under welfare plans) would seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost." Id. at 491. The court found that the plan documents
and summary plan description documents provided by Metropolitan had reserved the
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welfare plans, which cover all benefits other than pensions, because they were already regulated by the states and were not
viewed to be as significant as pension plans.
B. Challenges to Broken Promises Based on ERISA
Employees did not have "rights" in employer-established benefit plans prior to ERISA. The benefits payable under the plans
were considered to be revocable gifts which employers bestowed
upon deserving employees. Because the benefits were viewed as
gratuities provided at the employers' discretion with no consideration received from the employee, the employer could withdraw the
benefits and terminate the plan at will.8 9
Employee rights in employee benefit plans were first recognized in Inland Steel v. NLRB. 90 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employee gives his services as consideration for pension benefits. Following the Inland
Steel decision, employee benefit plans have not been considered
gratuities or revocable gifts.
employer's right to modify or terminate the plan at any time, and since welfare benefits do not automatically vest, the plaintiff Moores could not prevail. Id.
But see Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Employee Benefit Welfare Plans, 607
F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court held that benefits received by retirees
are status benefits that vest and that retirees have the right to continue to receive
them for life as long as they remain retired despite increased cost to their former
employer. In Eardman, the court considered whether the employer had "reserved the
right to reduce the terms of pensioner health care programs' coverage and to require
the payment of contributions by [him] in these programs." Id. at 198. The court rejected the employer's argument that it had reserved the right to modify the plan, to
reduce the level of health care coverage, or to require contributions by retirees covered under the plan, despite some disputed language, in view of the employer's oral
and written representations regarding continued benefits made to participants prior
to their retirement. Id. at 209. The court held that to allow the employer to terminate
or modify the plan, to reduce benefits, or to impose a deductible "would require the
Court to ignore the representations made by [defendants'] own agents to retirees...
concerning the scope of their benefits." Id. The court found "persuasive evidence" that
the employer intended to provide non-terminable lifetime health care benefits. Id. at
212. Then it found that the plaintiffs were "entitled as a matter of law to enforcement
of their rights to non-terminable medical and life insurance benefits under the terms
of the Plan documents in existence," id. at 215, during their employment and prior to
the adoption of a later plan which provided for payments and contributions to the cost
of medical care benefits by participants, deductibles prior to medical reimbursement,
and the right to modify the plan. Id.
89 McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1898), aff'd,
60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944).
90 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1948).
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Today, it is generally recognized that pension and postretirement welfare benefits are forms of deferred compensation which
an employee earns during active employment. Employers may no
longer modify benefits or terminate plans at will without reviewing them and considering liability for any commitments made. 9 1
The legislative history and court decisions demonstrate that
postretirement health care benefit plans were intended to be covered by ERISA, which was enacted to "promote the interest of employees (and retirees) and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans, and to protect contractually defined benefits."9 2 Congress
intended to protect employee and retiree rights in welfare benefits
as well as in pension benefits, and it intended that ERISA actions
seeking to enforce these rights be brought in federal district court.
To achieve the intent and purpose of ERISA, the federal
courts developed and apply a "federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."93 The legislative history of ERISA demonstrates that Congress intended for federal
courts to "fashion" a common law of employee benefits under ERISA in the same manner in which they fashioned federal common
law under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947. 9 4 In fact, the conference report 95 states that ERISA actions
are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States
in similar fashion to those brought under section 301.
It is a well recognized principle that federal courts have developed federal common law under section 301.96 Development of
federal common law under ERISA in connection with actions concerning postretirement health care benefit plans is consistent with
the congressional intent in adopting that statute.
91 See UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1007 (1984) (utilizing basic contract principles to interpret plan to determine if it
provided for lifetime health benefits and if benefits vested). The court stated that explicit language of collective bargainingagreements prevails where ambiguity exists
about the employer's right to terminate benefits. Id. at 1479. It also stated that when
there are remaining ambiguities in the health coverage provision of a plan, the parties must look to durational limitations of those provisions of the plan. Id. at 1480-82.
92 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
93 Id. at 110 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
94 REPORT,supra note 87.
95 REPORT, supra note 87.
96 See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
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C. The Unisys and PrimericaCases ChallengingModification
or Termination of PostretirementHealth Care Benefits
ERISA requires trustees and other fiduciaries of postretirement benefit plans to discharge their duties for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits in accordance with the employee benefit
plans in the same manner as a reasonably prudent person would
under principles of trust law. 97 They must be aware of ERISA and
the fiduciary duty it imposes when deciding to terminate or modify postretirement benefit plans. Employees and retirees of Elf
Aquitaine, Unisys, Primerica, and other corporations have challenged their employers' attempts to terminate or modify their
plans, and argued that the fiduciaries violated their ERISA
obligations.
On November 3, 1992, Unisys announced that, effective January 1, 1993, it would terminate its existing postretirement health
care benefit plans-the Sperry Plan, the Burroughs Plan, and the
Unisys Plan-and replace them with a new plan. Unisys identified the new plan as the "Unisys PostRetirement and Extended
Disability Medical Plan," ("Unisys PRM Plan"). It announced that
all medical coverage provided under preexisting plans would terminate on December 31, 1992.98 Immediately after the announcement, a class action suit, Romano v. Unisys Corp., was filed
against Unisys in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 99 The complaint alleged that during the
week of November 2, 1992, Unisys mailed an announcement booklet to participants and notified them that beginning in 1996, participants would pay the entire cost of the PRM Plan. Unisys projected that the cost in 1996 would be approximately $396 per
97 Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985).
98 In re Unisys Corp., Retiree Med. Ben. ERISA Lit., 837 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
99 Id. A complaint in Romano v. Unisys Corp., Civil Action No. 92-CV-6938 was
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
It is noted that eight different lawsuits were filed against Unisys in four separate
jurisdictions. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred and consolidated the cases for disposition in the United States Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The eight cases are: Bennett v. Unisys Corp., Civ. No. 93-1668 (E.D.
Pa.); Valle v. Unisys Corp., Civ. No. 93-60 1431 (E.D. Pa.); McMahon v. Unisys Corp.,
Civ. No. 93-0704 (E.D. Pa.); Romano v. Unisys Corp., Civ. No. 92-6938 (E.D. Pa.);
Yerkes v. Unisys Corp., Civ. No. 92-6906 (E.D. Pa.); Mercure v. Unisys Corp., No.
2:93-CV-71055 (E.D. Mich.); Pronk v. Unisys Corp., No. 3-92-812 (D. Minn.); Lofaso v.
Unisys Corp., No. 92-5429 (E.D.N.Y.). Id. at 672 n.1.
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month (or $4760 per year) for each covered person under age
sixty-five and $148 per month (or $1766 per year) for each covered
person over sixty-five. The complaint alleged that participants
were notified that beginning in 1995 under the new Unisys plan,
they would pay two-thirds of the cost of their coverage; in 1994
they would pay one-third of the cost; and in 1993 they would pay
approximately eleven percent of the cost. The complaint further
asserted that Unisys predicted that during the calendar year 1993
"for some participants and their spouses, costs of medical coverage
will increase as much as $573 and require class members to
choose between medical coverage and necessities of life."' 0 Paragraph thirty-six of the complaint alleged the following regarding
rule 106:
36. In its public announcement of these changes, Unisys
stated that it had adopted Standard 106 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and that Standard 106 required
Unisys to set-aside in reserve the funds required to pay medical
coverage under the existing Plans. In order to avoid these adverse consequences for its balance sheet, Unisys advised, it was
unilaterally terminating the prior plans.
In ruling on summary judgment motions, the court distinguished the "ambiguous" language reserving the right to modify
health benefits plans in other cases from the explicit language in
the Unisys plans. It held that Unisys had "unambiguously reserved its unilateral right to terminate the plan" and thus granted
the motion for "the denial of benefits claims of the Unisys subclass."1 °1 The court also ruled that the Burroughs plan "unambiguously reserved the termination rights" which Unisys sought to
exercise and thus granted the mnotion for the Burroughs subclass's denial of benefits claims.' . The court found that the
Sperry plan documents were "ambiguous" and rejected the motion
for the Sperry sub-class's denial of benefits claim.'0 3 Finally, the
court held that Unisys' decision to modify its benefits plans was
not "constrained by ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions," and that
"oral representations" regarding the terms of the plans by "agents
administraof Unisys and its successors, in their capacity as plan
10 4
tors," did not constitute breaches of fiduciary duty.
100

Unisys, 837 F. Supp. at 672.

101 Id. at 676.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104

Id. at 681.
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In a similar case, Alexander v. PrimericaHoldings, Inc.,1"5
the plaintiffs filed a class action suit and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent their employer from increasing their health
and life insurance monthly contributions and premiums. The
plaintiffs alleged that American Can Co. (Primerica's predecessor)
and Primerica maintained a retirement plan that provided lifetime pension and medical insurance benefits for qualified salaried
employees who retired. On or about January 9, 1989, Primerica
notified the participants of an increase in their monthly
mandatory contributions to the group medical insurance plan.
The complaint, fied against Primerica in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on December 14, 1989.
The plaintiffs further alleged that by letter dated October 26,
1992, Primerica notified its retirees of additional plan
modifications:
With this letter, we are notifying you of an additional change
in your rates; but, we are offering you some additional coverage
choices as well.
In 1993, Primerica will offer the following choice of coverage:
1) a newly designed program (the "New Plan") only for retirees
and/or spouses over age 65 that has been designed to cost the
same $50 per month that you are currently paying; 2) the programs currently offered to Primerica Corporate retirees, both
over and under 65 (called CCC/SB); and 3) your current medical
programs (the "Current Medical Plan"), both over and under age
65 ....

Effective January 1, 1993, retirees in the Primerica Group
Insurance Plan for Retired Salaried Employees will begin paying
premiums to cover 100% of the cost of continuing medical coverage. This decision is in line with Primerica's policy on medical
coverage for retirees
in those of its subsidiaries that offer contin108
uing coverage.
In granting the original motion for summary judgment, the
district court noted that Primerica would be exposed to significant
economic loss if, while waiting for a trial on the merits, it were
enjoined from making the proposed changes and from increasing
employee contributions and premiums for health and life insurance benefits. The court reasoned that if the injunction was
granted, Primerica would bear the financial burden of maintaining the medical and life insurance coverage at the current levels
105
106

811 F. Supp. 1025 (D.N.J. 1993).
Id. at 1031 (quoting Oct. 26, 1992 letter, at 1).
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for all plaintiffs in the class. The court found that an injunction
would cause Primerica to expend in excess of $1.7 million while
awaiting trial, and over $7 million by the time the appellate process ran its course.10 7 In addition, the Third Circuit held that the
language in the Summary Plan Descriptions was different, and
the reservation of the right to modify the plans was ambiguous
and "subject to reasonable alternative interpretations."10 8
D. Legal Challenges to Modification or Termination of
PostretirementHealth Care Benefit PlansBased on
Breach of Contract and Provisions Contained in
Merger Documents
In the absence of language reserving the right to terminate or
modify postretirement benefits, 09 courts generally apply the legal
maxim: The law abhorsa forfeiture. The plaintiff in Elf Aquitaine
urged the court to apply this aphorism and forbid his former employer from terminating or modifying its plan.
Section 12 of the amended tender offer agreement in the Elf
Aquitaine case specifically provided that "in all events, the Purchaser (EA Development) and SNEA (Societe National Elf Aquitaine) expect to continue whatever pension and other employee
benefit plans the Company now has or to offer comparable benefits
under new plans." 0 The plaintiff argued that the maxim should
be applied because Elf Aquitaine explicitly agreed to maintain the
postretirement health care plan, which provided lifetime benefits.
Id. at 1036. The court stated:
In this case, Primerica will be exposed to significant economic loss
should it be enjoined from making the proposed changes in the Plan. Primerica will be required to bear the financial burden for maintaining the medical
and life insurance coverage at the present levels for all Plaintiffs in the class.
As indicated below ... such an injunction would cause Primerica to expend
over $1.7 million between now and the anticipated time of trial .... In all
likelihood, by the time the appellate process runs its course, Primerica will
have expended more than $7,000,000 as a result of the injunction.

107

Id.
Apparently unable to post bond in the required amount of $7,733,513, the petitioners withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction and requested a full trial
on the merits.
108 Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted).
109 ERISA did not require plan documents to contain language reserving the
right to terminate them until 1984. See Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 607 F.
Supp. 196, 202 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
110 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
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Furthermore, the plaintiff maintained that there was no language
in the plan reserving the right to terminate or modify it; therefore,
Elf Aquitaine was not legally authorized to modify or terminate
the plan.' 1 '
In cases such as Elf Aquitaine,112 where the contractual com-

mitments to maintain postretirement health benefits are contained in merger documents, employees who are shareholders
may sue for violations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934113 if the acquiring company terminates or modifies the
plan. They may argue that the merger documents contain
promises to continue benefits; that the promises were material;
that they were stockholders to whom the solicitations and the
tender offer were addressed; and that the promises reasonably influenced their decision
as stockholders to accept the offer and
1 4
tender their shares.

3

When plaintiffs allege that termination or modification of
their postretirement benefits plan contravenes a tender offer
agreement or breaches a contract under section 14(a), 1 5 the ac111 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also GAF Corp. v. Poole, 715
F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Eardman,607 F. Supp. at 209.
112 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
113 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (providing jurisdiction for actions pertaining to violations of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
114 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
115 Section 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection ofinvestors, to solicit or to permit the use
of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781
of this title.
Id. Management, shareholders, and "any person" soliciting shareholder votes use the
proxy solicitation process because it is almost impossible for a sufficient number of
shareholders to physically assemble at a shareholders meeting and vote in person.
The purpose of Section 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation. The section stemmed from the congressional belief that 'fair corporate suffrage is an important right that
should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.'
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). It was intended to "control the
conditions under which proxies 'may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which ... (had) frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders.'" J.I. Case Co., 377 U.S. at 431 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1934)).
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tion should be brought in federal district court. Section 27 of the
1934 Act provides: "The district courts ...

shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder." 6 Section 27 grants the United States
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought under
section 14(a). Pursuant to sections 27 and 29(b) of the 1934
Act,"17 courts may award damages, rescission of a contract, issue
an injunction to prevent violation of the agreement, "use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done,"" x8 or fashion any
"appropriate relief" for breach of a merger agreement provision." 9
CONCLUSION

In the absence of a national health care plan, an uncontrollable rate of increase in health care costs continues. To comply with
the rule, employers subject to rule 106 are providing reasonable
health care benefits for active and retired employees. Many employers are attempting to lessen the budgetary impact of compliance with rule 106 by modifying their postretirement benefit
plans. Some are terminating their plans altogether. Others are
designing plans that reduce benefits or require employees and retirees to contribute more to the cost of their benefits, or both.
It could be argued that courts should relieve employers of
their obligation and permit them to modify or terminate their
postretirement benefit plans upon presenting clear and convincing
evidence of severe financial emergencies or other extraordinary
and extreme supervening circumstances (e.g. financially distressed corporation facing liquidation must terminate benefits and
reorganize to survive). It is unlikely, however, that employers will
prevail in arguing that such compliance with rule 106 causes such
emergencies.
While the nation awaits an acceptable national health care
plan, employees and retirees are suing to enjoin 2 ° employers from
116 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
117 Id. § 78cc.
118 J.L Case Co., 377 U.S. at 433 (citation omitted).
119 See id.; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
120 See Plaza Health Lab. Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1989); Jackson Dairy Inc. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953); Caufield
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breaking their promises by terminating or modifying postretirement plans. Meanwhile, employers that are subject to rule 106
and that have incurred substantial after-tax charges to comply
with the rule-and shareholders who have sustained significant
reductions in their equity-are looking for "relief" from the geometrically increasing financial burden.

v. Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 486 F. Supp. 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 632 F.2d
999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) (setting forth the standard for
issuance of preliminary injunction). The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit held that there must be a showing of possible irreparable injury and either (1)
probable success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly
toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
The party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that he will be irreparably
harmed if the injunction is not issued. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
269 (2d Cir. 1984). As a general rule, an "irreparable injury is... one for which the
court could not compensate the movant should he prevail on the merits of his action."
7 J. MooRE ET A.., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 65.04(1) (2d ed. 1989). To prevail,
the moving party must also demonstrate that the irreparable injury is actual and
imminent, not remote or speculative. State of N.Y. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
550 F.2d 745, 755 (2d Cir. 1977). Retirees often attempt to demonstrate irreparable
harm by asserting that their advanced age and poor health, coupled with the increased health insurance costs and fixed incomes, make it impossible for them to obtain substantially similar health benefits if their employer is permitted to reduce or
terminate their benefits.

